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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the stratification within the education systems of the social-
democratic welfare regime. Since 1990 the welfare states and education systems 
of Denmark, Finland, Norway Sweden has changed significantly. At the same 
time there has been a decrease in the power of the working class and its allies. 
According to the Power Resource Theory this should, at least eventually, lead to a 
roll-back in the welfare state. This paper attempts to observe whether this holds 
true for the education systems in the regime. In order to do that this study utilizes 
Esping-Andersen‟s concept of stratification to see if the countries within the re-
gime have shifted. The conclusion is that the results are mixed and that while 
stratification has increased in some aspects it has actually decreased in others 
mostly to do with an increase in the access to pre-school. 
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1 Introduction 
The role of education in society and how education policy should be shaped has always been 
at the forefront of the debate both in scientific and popular circles since the days of Plato and 
Aristotle. Traditionally, education has been a field reserved for the elites of society and their 
offspring with the idea of universal education for the common man not being common until 
the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries. Since then, education has continued to be an important part of the 
debate and an important issue for voters ranking as the 3
rd
 or 2
nd
 most important issue in the 
last three elections in Sweden and in Denmark the importance of increasing funding for edu-
cation has never been higher among voters (Statistika Central Byrån 2011 ) (Stubager et al. 
2013). At the same time the education systems in Scandinavia have, as will be shown in this 
thesis, gone through big changes the last 23 years. 
This thesis utilizes the countries of the so-called “social-democratic” welfare re-
gime. The concept of welfare regimes was created by the Danish researcher Gösta Esping-
Andersen when he published his influential study Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism in 
1990 which discussed the nature of welfare states in the developed world and how they fit 
into different clusters or regimes. Esping-Andersen sorted the states based upon two variables, 
de-commodification and stratification, and discovered that, in general, they constituted three 
different way to construct a welfare state. These three regimes were named the liberal (charac-
terized by low de-commodification and low stratification), the conservative (characterized by 
low de-commodification and high stratification) and the social-democratic regime (character-
ized by high de-commodification and low stratification). This study is focused on the Scandi-
navian countries of the social-democratic regime. The population in these countries is less 
reliant on the market and benefits and social provisions are generally universal compared to 
targeted assistance for the most needy (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000, p.332-333). 
This paper is divided into seven parts. Following this introductory chapter is a 
chapter which contains a research review. The third chapter is the method section and deals 
with the methods used in the study, including a review of the comparative research method 
and the problems with adjusting it in a temporal study. The fourth chapter provides infor-
mation about the theories this essay is built on and goes into the details of the power resource 
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theory as well as Esping-Andersen‟s theory of welfare regimes. The fifth chapter contains the 
results of the study and a discussion of the results and the variables used in it. The final chap-
ter concludes the essay with a discussion of the findings of the study and suggests possible 
future research. 
One theory that tries to explain the shape of welfare states is the Power Re-
source Theory. According to this theory, the shape of welfare states (and regimes by exten-
sion) is the power of the working class and their allies. If the working class and its allies are 
strong there is a greater chance that policies that mitigate market forces and decreased segre-
gation and stratification will be enacted. If the working class and its allies in the social-
democratic welfare regime had weakened that should also have an effect on stratification and 
de-commodification. Furthermore, this should also hold true for the education system of the 
countries included in the study. However, since complete de-commodification within the edu-
cation system is pretty much a given throughout the OECD this thesis will focus on the strati-
fication within the education systems. 
The focus of this study is the countries of the social-democratic welfare regime 
namely Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The reason for choosing the social-
democratic welfare regime and these countries is that ince 1990, when Esping-Andersen pub-
lished his book, education policy has shifted significantly within the social-democratic regime 
and the debate about how education should be provided has been high on the agenda. At the 
same time working-class organization and the strength of parties allied to the working class 
has decreased in virtually all of the countries in the study and policies that could be assumed 
to increase stratification have been enacted (OECD 2012). This would imply, according to the 
Power Resource Theory, that the education systems within the social-democratic welfare re-
gime would become more stratified.  
This paper hypothesis that the education systems within the social-democratic 
welfare regime have changed since 1990 and that the general trend since then is an increase in 
stratification within the education systems. This should be seen in a larger prevalence of free 
school choice, in the increased prevalence of practices such as ability grouping, attempts to 
divide students at an earlier stage, increased use of standardized tests and a decrease in the 
availability and subsidization of pre-schools.  This increase in stratification would also fit into 
the Power Resource Theory and further strengthen that theory.  
 What this study finds is that while the Power Resource Theory postulates that if 
the working class and its allies in the social-democratic welfare regime had decreased in pow-
er that should also have an effect on stratification and de-commodification. However, since 
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complete de-commodification within the education system is pretty much a given throughout 
the OECD we should only be able to see increases in stratification and not de-
commodification. Nevertheless, what this paper finds is that the results are mixed. While 
some of the variables studied have shown a clear increase in stratification others show signs 
of the opposite or no change at all. This might be due to the timeframe used for the study or 
show a deeper problem when using the Power Resource Theory to understand changes within 
the field of education. 
1.1 Research Question 
My research question is as follows: Has there been a shift towards a higher degree of strat-
ification in the education systems of the countries making up the social democratic re-
gime? If so can this change be explained by the weakening of the working class and its al-
lies in accordance with the Power Resource Theory? 
 This question will be answered by examining variables with an effect on stratifi-
cation within education and if there has been a change in those variables in the countries 
studied. This will then be compared with the change in union density within the countries 
in order to determine if there has been a decline in working class strength. 
  
1.1 Background and previous Research 
The idea of education as a mean of dividing/sorting the population is not a new 
one. Marxist thinkers and researchers have spent especially much time on the sub-
ject with many of them viewing the education system as a tool of the capi-
tal/bourgeoisie with which to mold the labor pool according to their needs. In par-
ticular, Gramsci had a lot to say about the education system and the problems with 
stratified education (1970). According to Gramsci the aim should be “to create a 
single type of formative school (primary-secondary) which would take the child 
up to the threshold of his choice of job,” thus proposing a non-divided school void 
of sorting and with as little stratification as possible (1970, p.40). 
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1.1.1 Previous Research 
This is not the first paper researching the topic welfare regimes and education nor 
will it be the last. Most of the previous research has focused on tertiary education, 
probably due to the fact that the concepts of stratification and especially de-
commodification are much clearer and easier to research in that setting (see Yao 
& James 2012 and Bastedo & Jaquette 2009). In fact, de-commodification within 
primary and secondary education is virtually non-existent within the OECD. 
 One exception to this is Beblavý et al, whose study looks at whether strati-
fication within the education system goes together with stratification within the 
welfare state as well as the role of the family and state in providing welfare 
(2011). The study finds that the states within the OECD can be organized in dif-
ferent clusters depending on their attempts at equalization and family/market in-
volvement in providing education (Beblavý et al. 2011, p.27). This study is im-
portant because it shows that there is a connection between low stratification in 
the welfare system in general and low stratification within the education system. 
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2 Method 
 
 
This study aims to compare the education systems of the countries belonging to Esping-
Andersen‟s social democratic regime today to how they looked in 1990 in relation to the con-
cept of stratification. To that effect I‟ve decided upon five variables that have an effect on 
stratification with the goal of creating a cross-temporal study. The variables are: School 
Choice (can the parents student choose their school), Ability Grouping, Early Sorting, and 
Child Care (subsidized and available for all?). These variables have been chosen because they 
have been shown to have an effect on education stratification in previous research. The justi-
fication for these variables is also covered more in depth in the results chapter. Most of the 
data, especially the data for 1990, is retrieved from primary sources, chiefly the laws regulat-
ing education policy as they were at the time and in certain cases where it was felt to be nec-
essary commentaries on the laws in question. Besides laws I also make use of secondary 
sources such as publications by EURES. 
 One negative side effect of this approach is that the laws might not actually rep-
resent the situation in practice but rather how it should be. Also, law and the purpose of law 
vary from country to country and whereas one country might detail everything in statue an-
other might, for example, give courts a bigger leeway in interpreting laws. However, the laws 
do say a lot about how the system is intended to function ideally which is of the greatest inter-
est to this study. 
 Another problem, as with most quantitative data, is the lack of reliability within 
the results. I cannot know for sure that the variables chosen really describe what I believe they 
do. The limited number of cases also creates a validity problem, however, since I have studied 
every country within the social-democratic welfare regime this should serve to mitigate that 
concern. 
 
2.1 Comparative Research with a Temporal Twist 
Comparative research is an old research method and is described by Bartolini as follows “The 
main purpose of comparative research has been to identify regularities in human political af-
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fairs and to establish theoretical and empirically refutable propositions that could explain the-
se regularities” (1993, p.139). To do this researchers “compare political phenomena in differ-
ent situational contexts”, for example, Esping-Andersen‟s comparison of different welfare 
states (Bartolini 1993, p.139) (Esping-Andersen 1990). The field of modern comparative re-
search within the social sciences go back to the ideas of Weber and Durkheim (Ragin & Zaret 
1983, p.731). However, Weber and Durkheim had two different approaches to comparative 
research and how it should be carried out. Weber believed in ideal types “to enable limited 
generalization about historical divergence;” these generalizations can then “point to different 
patterns of process” that should not be confused with natural laws (Ragin & Zaret 1983, 
p.731-732). In contrast, Durkheim, who also believed in the complexity of the social world, 
held that social policy should emulate the laboratory experiments of the natural sciences as 
much as possible and believed that sociology as a discipline needed to “transcend a preoccu-
pation with detail and uniqueness” and instead look for generalizations (Ragin & Zaret 1983, 
p.732). Another central tenant of Durkheim‟s approach was the existence of “social species” 
which are discrete types of societies necessary in order for comparisons and generalizations to 
be done (ibid). What both Weber and Durkheim had in common was that they saw compara-
tive research as a middle road between complexity and generalization (Ragin & Zaret 1983, 
p.732-733). 
 As previously stated, this thesis is based on cross-temporal comparative re-
search. When doing cross-temporal studies there are specific challenges to be encountered 
compared to doing non-temporal research. Bartolini writes that it‟s important to recognize 
that when studying policy over several different points in time “variances in each property 
under analysis can be obtained through observation of the same unit … located at different 
points in a temporal sequence” (1993, p.135). There are mainly three problems to take into 
account when doing temporal comparative research according to Bartolini (1993, p.147). The 
first problem has to do with the choice of temporal units, in other words how to decide on 
which time periods to study (ibid). This paper uses the 1
st
 of January 1990 and the 1
st
 of Janu-
ary 2013 as the two units of time for the study. 1990 is chosen due to the fact that it may be 
seen as the last year before the fall of the Soviet Union and rise of the new politics associated 
with that event. The 1
st
 of January 2013 is chosen because it represents the present and how 
the education systems look today.  The second problem deals with generalizations. Bartolini 
claims that cross-time generalizations differs to an important degree from those of cross-unit 
generalizations (1993, p.153). For this paper the issue is whether we can discover the sequen-
tial rules of the temporal variables (Bartolini 1993, p.154). That is if a change in unionization 
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density over time has an effect on the stratification variables. The third of Bartolini‟s prob-
lems concerns multicolinearity (1993, p.157). The problem with multicolinearity in a tem-
poral study is that it might be difficult to “disentangle temporal presence and relative im-
portance” (Bartolini 1993, p.157-158). This is a problem when making a study like this since 
one can‟t be sure that a change in stratification depends on a change in Power Resources and 
not some other parallel temporal phenomena. In other words there might be a reliability prob-
lem. However, there are also benefits with temporal studies such as that you increase the 
number of cases, for example when studying several variables in several countries over dif-
ferent time periods increasing the validity of the study (Bartolini 1993, p.145-146). In this 
paper that means that we double the amount of variables by looking at two time periods. 
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3 Theory  
 
 
This thesis will make use of two theories in order to explain Scandinavian education policy 
and how it has changed. The two theories are the Power Resource Theory and the Welfare 
Regime Theory. The Power Resource theory explains how welfare states, including the edu-
cation system, come to be shaped in different ways in different countries and why certain na-
tions have a strong welfare state while others have a very limited, comparatively, welfare 
state. The Welfare Regimes Theory is an offshoot of the Power Resource Theory and it‟s used 
to explain how welfare states differ and to categorize the welfare states. This paper uses the 
Power Research Theory to explain the causal variable for the increase in stratification within 
the Scandinavian welfare states. The Welfare Regimes Theory is used to both highlight the 
concepts of stratification and de-commodification and why they are important to understand 
the Scandinavian welfare state. Together these two theories form the base of this thesis and 
for understanding the retrenchment taking place within the education sector in the social 
democratic welfare regimes. 
 
 
3.1 Power Resource Theory 
One of the most prominent theories about what shapes the structure of advanced welfare 
states is the power resource theory. Pontusson and Kwon describe it in the following way: 
“Power resource theory essentially posits that „working-class mobilization‟ is a critical deter-
minant of the public provision of social welfare or, more specifically, the extent to which pub-
lic welfare systems redistribute income and labor-market risks” (Kwon & Pontusson 2006, 
p.1). This means that states with a more organized and better represented working class will 
have welfare systems that are larger in size and more redistributive (ibid). Another way to 
look at power resource theory is in the form of conflicts and that the “welfare state develop-
ment is likely to reflect class-related distributive conflict and partisan politics” (Korpi 2006). 
Both of these perspectives are in agreement that it is the strength and actions of groups within 
society that has the most profound impact on the shape of the welfare system. 
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 Power resource theory was created in the late 1970‟s and was advanced by the 
so-called Scandinavian school of social researchers (Olsen & Connor 1998, p.3). The theory 
was an attempt to assuage the perceived short-comings in the dominant theories of the day 
(Olsen & Connor 1998, p.3-4). The origins of what would become power resource theory can 
be found in the works of Gerhardt Lenski who ”argued that democratic polities created the 
possibility for the „many‟ to combine against the „few‟ (the elites) and use the state to claim a 
larger share of the social surplus” on the condition of mass organization among workers 
(Myles & Quadagno 2002, p.37)  In particular there were three theories that were dominant in 
the decades leading up to the introduction of the power resource theory: structural functional-
ist theories, pluralist theories and neo-Marxist theories (Olsen & Connor 1998, p.4-5). The 
structural functionalists, such as Durkheim, held that “political institutions arose in response 
to universal stresses and needs which emerged as simple societies evolved into more complex 
entities” (Olsen & Connor 1998 p.4). The creation of the welfare state can thus be seen “as a 
society‟s way of adapting gradually to the changes brought about by modernization, industri-
alization, and population growth rather than as the result of philanthropy, innovation, or polit-
ical machination” (ibid). The proof of this, according to the structural functionalists, is that 
within the advanced economies that have experienced the highest economic growth, industri-
alization etc., we can see the emergence of the welfare state (Olsen & Connor 1998, p.4). 
 Pluralists, in contrast to structural functionalists, argued that it was actors that 
were the central catalysts of change in social institutions and the welfare state (Olsen & Con-
nor 1998, p.5). Korpi claims that the essence of the pluralist argument is that “the essence of 
power and its consequences are revealed and can be studied primarily in situations where 
power is actually exercised” (Korpi 1998, p.38). Pluralists “maintained that power is widely 
diffused among a variety of competing interest groups and not held by ruling elites or clas-
ses“, and that “no one particular group predominates at all the times over all issues” (ibid). 
Therefore, social changes and policies are more a result of the government‟s response to the 
lobbying of different interest groups representing different interest groups (Olsen & Connor 
1998, p.5). The most famous work in this school of thought is Robert Dahl‟s study of the 
community of New Haven, Connecticut, and how political policies are shaped and created 
there (Dahl 1961). Dahl was pre-occupied with the concept of power, which he described as 
“A has the power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not oth-
erwise do” (Korpi 1998, p. 39). Because of this, the pluralist tradition has been mainly fo-
cused on concrete decision making and on “who prevails in decision making” (ibid).  
  10 
 Finally, Neo-Marxist theories have had a great impact on what would become 
power resource theory. Neo-Marxist theories took issue with the false notion of stability and 
consensus that the other theories propagated, in fact if there was a consensus it was “enforced 
through economic and political domination” (Olsen & Connor 1998, p.5). Unlike pluralists, 
the neo-Marxists didn‟t believe that power was diffused among different interest groups. In-
stead, they believed that it was concentrated to capitalists that could use it to control the state 
(ibid). Welfare programs are initiated because capitalists want them in order to “increase out-
put, stabilize or revitalize the economy, and pre-empt or defuse working class militancy (Ol-
sen & Connor 1998, p.5-6). Some of the neo-Marxists, more closely aligned with functionalist 
thought, considered all of this to be structurally determined and that the government automat-
ically worked for the, some-times long term, interests of the capitalist class (Olsen & Connor 
1998, p.6).  
 Power resource theorists disagreed with the lack of class conflict within the ear-
lier theories and their failure to explain the variation in the growth of the welfare states (Olsen 
& Connor 1998, p.6). They agreed with the neo-Marxists that the capitalist class was by far 
the most important and powerful group in society but argued that “the balance of power be-
tween labor and capital was fluid and therefore variable” (ibid). Contrary to traditional Marx-
ism, they also argued that the working class could “augment their power by forming coali-
tions with other classes, such as agrarian or white-collar workers” (Olsen & Connor 1998, 
p.6). The core of the resource power theorists arguments was therefore that it is politics that 
matter, even though structures have a role, and that without a strong working class/left wing 
coalition there is nothing that compels “the rich nations to commit resources to the develop-
ment of a welfare state” (Olsen & Connor 1998, p. 7). Furthermore, power resource theorists 
argue that there is too much of an emphasis on economic development in explaining the early 
welfare states and that if one examines which countries were the first to introduce welfare 
services, Germany and Austria, they are also the countries with the most active labor move-
ments at the time (Olsen & Connor 1998, p.7-8). 
 Central to the power resource theory, like the pluralists, is the concept of power. 
Unlike the industrialization theorists Power Resource theorists, chiefly Korpi, claimed that 
“‟politics matters‟ in explaining welfare state diversity, ”and that the welfare states in the 
“democratic west” can be said to reflect the organization and political leverage of the welfare 
state (Myles & Quadagno 2002, p.37). However, power resource theorists‟ definition of pow-
er differs from that of the pluralists. Korpi himself would define power resources as “the at-
tributes (capacities or means) of actors (individuals or collectives) which enable them to re-
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ward or to punish other actors” (Korpi 1998, p.42). Additionally, “since power is a relational 
concept, the attributes of actors become power resources only among two or more interde-
pendent actors who have at least some interests in the attributes of the other actor” further-
more is not a zero-sum game and the exercise of power can be defined “in terms of the activa-
tion of power resources in the relation to other actors” (Korpi 1998, p.42). These power re-
sources can be put into three different categories: coercive power resources, renumerative 
power resources and normative power resources (Korpi 1998, p.42-43). Coercive power re-
sources refers to resources that involve physical sanctions, such as violence, renumerative 
resources refers to “resources involving the control over material rewards”, and normative 
resources refers to the “allocation or manipulation of symbolic rewards and deprivations” 
(Korpi 1998, p.43). According to Korpi, coercive resources “generate an alienation among 
persons subject to them”, renumerative resources “create a calculative orientation” and nor-
mative resources “generate positive orientations” (ibid). Furthermore, the costs, described as 
the need to monitor those subject to the resources, “tend to be highest for the coercive and 
lowest for the normative” (Korpi 1998, p.43). Therefore, power and power resources are not 
homogenous and come in several different shapes with varying attributes. Korpi further ar-
gues that there are three major types of power resources in the Western world: violence, prop-
erty and labor power (Korpi 1998, p.44). Violence is the most abundant of the types; it‟s gen-
erally reserved for the state and the drawback is the high cost, as it is with coercive resources 
in general (ibid). 
 Pontusson and Kwon describe the Power Resource Theory in the following way: 
“Power resource theory essentially posits that “working-class mobilization” is a critical de-
terminant of the public provision of social welfare or, more specifically, the extent to which 
public welfare systems redistribute income and labor-market risks” (Kwon & Pontusson 2006, 
p.1). This means that states with a more organized and better represented working class will 
have welfare systems that are bigger in size and more redistributive (ibid). Another way to 
look at power resource theory is in the form of conflicts and that the “welfare state develop-
ment is likely to reflect class-related distributive conflict and partisan politics” (Korvi 2006). 
Both of these perspectives are in agreement that it is the strength and actions of groups within 
society that has the most profound impact on the shape of the welfare system. 
 
3.1.1 Critique of Power Resource Theory 
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Power resource theory has become one of if not the most dominant theories within the field of 
welfare state research but it is not without its detractors nor is there a lack of alternative theo-
ries. 
 One of the main critiques against power resource theory, as espoused by Korpi 
and Esping-Andersen, is brought forth by Swenson who argue that the difference between 
welfare states cannot be explained by the relative power of the labor movement/left-wing and 
instead that extensive welfare states, like the Swedish one, were created in cooperation with 
employers (Swenson 2002, p. 10). Using the example of Sweden he points towards cases in 
which the employers were willing to go further than the Social Democrats and that in many 
regards the Swedish welfare state lagged behind the American one until the late 1940‟s and 
1950‟s (Swenson 2002, p.10-11). Swenson argues that even though the works of some power 
resources theorists show that there is a correlation between strong leftist parties/labor move-
ments and welfare state development that “the correlation does not prove causation was at 
work” and that it does not take into account whether there is also an interest among capitalists 
to introduce reforms (Swenson 2002, p.9). Instead, the shape of the Swedish welfare system 
vis-à-vis the American can be explained by the common interests of the labor movement and 
the capitalist class (Swenson 2002, p.321-322). 
 Hall and Soskice espouses a argument similar to Swenson by claiming that 
power resource theory omits the importance of the employers and firms in its explanation of 
the welfare state (Hall & Soskice 2001). Hall and Soskice refers to their approach to welfare 
theory as “Varieties of Capitalism” and is an actor-centered theory that sees “the political 
economy as a terrain populated by multiple actors, each of whom seeks to advance his inter-
ests in a rational way in strategic interaction with others” (Hall & Soskice 2001, p.2-6). Their 
theory argues that we should “see companies as the crucial actors in a capitalist economy” and 
that “they are the key agents of adjustment in the face of technological change or international 
competition whose activities aggregate into overall levels of economic performance” (Hall & 
Soskice 2001 p.6). The crux of their argument is thus, as formulated by Korpi, that “where 
production requires asset-specific skills, employers have been key actors with first-order pref-
erences for social programs providing insurance for investments in specific skills” (Korpi 
2006, p.170). Furthermore, welfare systems are not reflections of the balance of power be-
tween labor and capital but come from the strength of the employers and should be “under-
stood as complements to national production systems requiring asset-specific skills” (ibid). 
 Power Resource Theorists such as Korpi reject many of the premises of the Va-
rieties of Capitalism Theory (Korpi 2006). Korpi writes that “companies are unlikely to have 
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social citizenship expansion as a first-order preference driving them to become agenda setters 
in welfare state expansion” (Korpi 2006, p.181). The argument is that it is difficult to observe 
actors‟ preferences by gauging their actions but it is possible to observe when they enter the 
policy process, and how, in the adaption of social policies (Korpi 2006, p.181-182). Korpi 
identifies three ways to engage in policy which, according to him, should tell one something 
about the preferences of the actors are they the ones initiating the policies (protagonists), the 
ones getting involved in subsequent stages of the process (consenters) or do they persistently 
oppose the policies (antagonists) (Korpi 2006, p.282). What Varieties of Capitalism theorists 
get wrong, Korpi argues, is that they confuse consenters with protagonists and that if the Va-
rieties of Capitalism theory held true then employers/firms should be the protagonists, the 
agenda setters (Korpi 2006, p.182-183). Korpi finds that “employer-centered research has not 
yet presented empirical evidence indicating that employers have been protagonists with first-
order preferences for major reforms extending social citizenship” thus not being instrumental 
in bring about social policy (Korpi 2006, p.202). Furthermore, “political parties responsible 
for legislation have represented primarily relatively broad-based class interests rather than 
skill-specific interest groups” decreasing the likelihood that it‟s the need for  asset-specific 
skills that determines the shape of the welfare state (Korpi 2006, p.204). 
 A third theory that is not in direct opposition to the Power Resource Theory but 
should rather be seen as a compliment to it is Quality of Government Theory (Rothstein 
2011). Proponents of the Quality of Government Theory takes issue with the lack of inclusion 
of institutions as explanatory power and that they are viewed “as simple arenas for conflict 
among social classes or as useful political tools for the parties involved in this struggle” 
(Rothstein 2011, p.2). The Quality of Government theory posits that there are two reasons for 
supporting welfare state policies: “that there social classes give rise to different social risks, 
and rational wage workers (and their representatives) reasonably opt for some kind of protec-
tion from these risks” or “a demand for redistribution based on either norms about social jus-
tice or class-based self-interest” (Rothstein 2011, p.3). What Quality of Government theorists 
asks themselves is what makes people trust the state to carry out the task of risk protection 
and redistribution and not some other entity (ibid).   The answer is for the state to get a large 
role in providing redistribution and risk protection there needs to be “a reasonably high level 
of QoG, political mobilization for welfare state policies in the way that PRT has outlined is 
unlikely to have broad appeal” that is the people have to trust the state in order for it to take a 
big role in providing welfare (Rothstein 2011,. p11). The problem with Power Resource The-
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ory is that it‟s too one-sided and disregards the importance of good governance as a necessity 
for the large state-funded welfare states in Scandinavia. 
 For this study the main limitation of Power Resource Theory is the fact that not 
many researchers have tried to apply it to the field of education as a part of the welfare state. 
Unlike other policies such as health care and unemployment insurance the effects of a change 
in education policy is far more long term and there are few “gains” to be had for either side in 
the short term. However, in the long term education is one of the most important redistribu-
tive tools that the state has and the importance of education for the working class, and with as 
little stratification as possible, is something that is espoused by several important socialist 
thinkers such as Marx and especially Gramsci.  
 
3.2 The Three Welfare Regimes Theory 
The welfare state is a comparatively novel idea and can trace its origins back to the early days 
of the labor movement as well as with the conservative Right in Germany (Wahl 2011, p.22-
23). This was done partially in response to the growing, but still weak, power of the nascent 
labor movement but also due to the needs of the growing German economy (Wahl 2011, 
p.23). Since those early days the welfare state has both evolved and expanded with events 
such as the great depression and the booming post-war years (Wahl 2011, p.23-25). Today all 
developed countries today can arguably be described as some form of welfare states with so-
cial rights being seen as something self-evident among most people.  
 Research on welfare states has been, as discussed in the previous chapter, going 
on almost as long as the existence of welfare states themselves. It‟s also been common 
knowledge for quite some time that welfare states differ from each other and that some are 
more encompassing than others. In 1989/90 Gösta Esping-Andersen saw a pattern in this and 
concluded that the welfare regimes could roughly be clustered into three different groups or 
regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990). Esping Andersen called these regimes the liberal regime, 
the corporatist regime and the social democratic regime (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.26-27). 
Esping-Andersen‟s model/theory has since then been picked up by other researchers who 
have modified it by adding new and different regimes or moving some welfare states into dif-
ferent regimes from Esping-Andersen; however, the central core of Esping-Andersen‟s prem-
ise remains (Kwon 1997) (Fenger 2007). Central to Esping-Andersen‟s typology is the con-
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cepts of stratification and de-commodification and his three regimes are based on ideal types 
of those concepts. 
 Esping-Andersen is an adherent of the Power Resource theory and holds that his 
regimes can be causally explained in part by the Power Resource Theory. Furthermore, 
Esping-Andersen believes that it is the coalitions between classes and not the strength of the 
working class/left wing parties which determine the shape of the welfare state with the work-
ing class allying with farmers or white collar workers at different points in time (Esping-
Andersen 1998, p.146-148). The regimes can therefore also be seen as created by the conflict 
that defines the Power Resource Theory. 
 
3.2.1 De-commodification 
 
 
One of the two core concepts that Esping-Andersen uses to group welfare states is de-
commodification. De-commodification can be explained as “the extent to which commodities 
are not exclusively exchanged on market principles” (Willemse & de Beer 2012, p.108). 
Esping-Andersen‟s concept of de-commodification differs slightly to this interpretation and 
“refers to the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially accepted standard 
of living independently of market participation” (1990, p.37). This paper will make use of this 
definition of de-commodification unless otherwise stated. 
Esping-Andersen considers there to be three “sets of dimensions” when it comes 
to determining the extent of de-commodification within the welfare state (1990, p.47). The 
first dimension is the issue of accessibility of welfare benefits. A welfare state has a higher 
degree of de-commodification “if access is easy, and if rights to an adequate standard of liv-
ing are guaranteed regardless of previous employment record, performance, needs-test, or 
financial contribution” (ibid). For example, the American health care system where only cer-
tain needs-tested groups, the poor and elderly, have free access to health care can be said to 
have a low degree of de-commodification.  
The second dimension is that of income replacements. That happens “if benefits 
levels fall substantially below normal earnings or the standard of living considered adequate 
and acceptable in the society,” thus driving “the recipient back to work as soon as possible” 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, p.47). This has the effect of making individuals and families, the 
people, more reliant on the market for achieving a reasonable living standard. For example, 
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Swedish benefits for the unemployed (socialbidrag) are calculated to provide for what the 
state considers to be an adequate standard of living. If the state was to decrease the amount 
that the unemployed are eligible for then they would have to turn to the market in order to 
keep the same standard of living. 
The third dimension of de-commodification encompasses the range of entitle-
ments which are provided for by the state. These range from “protection against the basic so-
cial risks: unemployment, disability, sickness and old age” to a more advanced case “where a 
social wage is paid to citizens regardless of cause” (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.47). For exam-
ple, in a laissez-fair state with no unemployment benefits or paid sick-leave one is more de-
pendent on the market and one‟s job to keep one‟s standard of living.   
 
3.2.2 Stratification 
Stratification is the second core concept within Esping-Andersen‟s theory of welfare regimes. 
Willemse and de Beer describe stratification within the welfare state as “the (status) hierarchy 
produced by welfare state policies” (Willemse & De Beer 2012, p.108). Esping-Andersen‟s 
take on stratification and the welfare state is that “the welfare state shapes class and status in 
different ways” and that there are several dimensions to stratification (Esping Andersen 1990, 
pp.57-58). These dimensions range from the clear-cut income-distributive role of the state, 
including what the state does to decrease income disparity, to the education system and the 
organization of social services (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.58). Stratification, in other words, 
describes what the welfare state does to increase or decrease class and status differences. 
According to Esping-Andersen there are three ideal types of stratification with, 
each cultivating different values (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.58). These values are referred to 
as hierarchy and status, dualisms and universalism and correspond, roughly, with the three 
different welfare regimes identified by Esping-Andersen (ibid). The first value, hierarchy and 
status, is commonly associated with the corporatist or conservative regime (Esping-Andersen 
1990, p.58-61). In this regime it‟s held that “traditional status relations must be retained for 
the sake of social integration” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p.58). These values and beliefs date 
back to the inception of what is considered the first welfare state, imperial Germany of the 
late 19
th
 century, and are based on concepts of paternalism and authoritarianism (Esping-
Andersen 1990, p.59). The welfare state in this regime aims to increase class differences ra-
ther than to decrease/eliminate them and to create status barriers (ibid). One legacy of these 
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values is the myriad of different social benefits for different social groups from pensions to 
unemployment benefits (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.60-61). 
Dualism is the second value and can be found within states belonging to the lib-
eral regime (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.61-65). The idea of the liberal regime is that “by with-
holding aid, or helping to eliminate traditional systems of social protection, and by refusing to 
place nothing but the market in their place” it‟s possible to  “grant the cash nexus a hegemon-
ic role in the organization of social and economic life” (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.62). Ac-
cording to Esping-Andersen this in practice creates dualism in society through means-tested 
relief and the social stigma attached to claiming social benefits (ibid). In reality liberal re-
gimes often “came to incorporate a blend of welfare capitalism in the market, and social in-
surance in the public sector” due to the failure of the private sector to provide welfare benefits 
by itself (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.63). The legacy of the liberal regime is needs-tested bene-
fits, help to self-help and competitive individualism (ibid). 
Universalism is the value of the social-democratic welfare regime (Esping-
Andersen 1990, p.65-69). According to Esping-Andersen the view of the social-democratic 
regime was that it “was the construction of solidarity that mattered” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 
p.65). In order to achieve that solidarity between workers the differences between different 
groups of workers had to be minimized (ibid). In the modern welfare state this is character-
ized by “broad popular universalism” the idea that the welfare system is just not for the 
needy, such as in the liberal regime, or that the benefits would differ for different groups of 
workers, such as in the corporatist regime (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.67). This is best exem-
plified in benefits such as universal subsidized day care and tuition-free universities. 
 
3.2.3 Critique of Welfare Regimes Theory 
Since Esping-Andersen published his theory of welfare regimes in 1990 it has been criticized 
by several researchers from different vantage points and angles. These critiques range from 
arguing that there should be more than three regimes, to the lack of a gender perspective, to 
researchers who argue that there are no welfare regimes at all. 
                      Bronchorst‟s critique of Esping-Anderson is based on feminist grounds. Bron-
chorst argues that Esping-Andersen “largely ignores gender” and that the theory of welfare 
regimes lacks a gender dimension (Bronchorst 1994, p.27). Bronchorst claims that when 
Esping-Andersen “notes differences in women‟s positions within the regimes, he mainly de-
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scribes them; he does not explain them.” She also claims that Esping-Andersen is too pre-
occupied with the relationship between the state and the market and largely neglects the insti-
tution of family (Bronchorst 1994, p.27-28). Bronchorst further argues that welfare policies 
affect men and women differently and that if one only examines women then the regimes 
would look quite different, especially when it comes to de-commodification (Bronchorst 
1994, p.28). In fact, if Esping-Andersen had been analyzing only women then “the liberal and 
especially conservative regimes have contributed to the de-commodification, in the sense that 
they have actively supported a housewife-breadwinner family model” in contrast to the social 
democratic regimes that have commodified them (ibid). Another gender related critique of 
Esping-Andersen‟s research comes from Lewis, who states  that “it misses one of the central 
issues in the structuring of welfare regimes: the problem of valuing the unpaid work that is 
done primarily by women in providing welfare, mainly within the family, and in securing 
those providers social entitlements” (Lewis 1992, p.160). However, Jenson argues that Lewis 
is off base with her critique and take issue with her attempt to equate unpaid work with care 
(Jenson 1997, p.183). Jenson claims that “parental leave and other care allowances show, car-
ing work within the family can be paid work” and that her failure to acknowledge that “ren-
ders invisible certain gendering practices” (ibid). This clashes with Lewis‟s claim that care 
work in the family is not compensated and also her notion that the Scandinavian welfare state 
commodifies women. 
 As referenced earlier, there are also those who disagree with the whole concept 
of welfare regime rather than how to define the regimes. These arguments have different em-
pirical bases but all agree that the concept of welfare regimes is flawed and that it is not pos-
sible to neatly group advanced welfare states into groups of similar “regimes”. One of these 
critics is Kasza who argues that the Welfare Regime Theory “cannot survive a demonstration 
that individual states in fact embrace contradictory policies” and that in order for a welfare 
state to belong to a coherent regime then  “most of the key policies will indeed reﬂect a simi-
lar approach to issues of public welfare” (Kasza 2002, p.271-272). Also, according to Kasza 
the welfare regimes “embodies a distinctive rationale for public welfare” these rationales 
range from the idea of universalism in the social democratic regime, to the work-ethic of the 
liberal regime,  to the preservation of status within the conservative regime (Esping-Andersen 
1990, p.26-27) (Kasza 2002, p.272). In other words what can be expected from a welfare state 
belonging to a certain regime, according to Kasza, is that they confirm to a set of principles 
common to the regime yet this is not the case. 
  19 
In fact, Kasza claims that welfare states consists of a “contradictory and dis-
jointed set of policies that are far from constituting a coherent whole of any sort” (Kasza 
2002, p.272-273). Welfare policies are generally not adopted as part of some bigger plan but 
are, as a rule, adopted piecemeal at different times in a country‟s history (Kasza 2002, p.273). 
For example, pension systems were adopted over a long period of time and in a country such 
as Sweden parts of the pension system can be dated back to 1913 before the emergence of the 
modern welfare state (ibid). Welfare state and systems are thus put together over long time 
periods with different governments and goals in mind. In a similar vein, different parts of the 
welfare state were created at different times with reforms rarely changing the whole state in-
stantly (Kasza 2002, p.274). In truth, the average time between the major change in the two of 
the three major aspects of the welfare state (unemployment, health and pensions) is 15 years 
and on average it took over 23 years for most states to create the welfare state they have today 
(Kasza 2002 p.274-275). Furthermore, welfare policies are generally not, with the exception 
of very small countries, under one ministry but spread out over several ministries such as the 
labor ministry, the health ministry etc (Kasza 2002 p.277-278). This would further suggest, 
according to Kasza, that there is no such thing as a unified welfare regime. 
I would agree with Kasza that there is no such thing as a real ideal welfare re-
gime just as there are no real ideal way to describe almost all social constructs. As with the 
Power Resource Theory there is also the problem that the theory isn‟t developed with the field 
of education in mind. Finally, there is also a problem that there is more or less full de-
commodification when it comes to elementary and secondary schooling since it‟s free in all 
advanced welfare states. However, this is not a problem since this thesis is concerned with the 
effects on stratification which certainly exists in the education systems of the advanced indus-
trial economies. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Variables 
In order to measure stratification within the education system it is important to determine 
which policies can be said to increase or decrease stratification. In order to do that I use 
Esping-Andersen‟s definition of stratification within the welfare state, that is if the policy 
increases or decreases class or status differences (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.58). Thus those 
policies that have a proven effect on class or status differences are of interest to this thesis. 
Specifically I‟ve decided on five variables that have been proven in peer-reviewed studies 
(described in detail below) to have an effect on stratification and they are the ones the analyti-
cal section of this thesis will focus on. These variables are the following: Ability grouping (if 
students are grouped by ability or age), School choice (if the parents of the student are free to 
choose which elementary school to attend), standardized testing (if and when is it implement-
ed), sorting (when are students sorted according to their ability), pre-school (is it subsidized 
and are kids guaranteed a spot). The goal is that these variables will show if there has been a 
real change in education policy within the social democratic regime the last 23 years. 
 
4.1.1 Ability Grouping 
The effects of ability grouping are something that has been studied since the early 1900‟s but 
it wasn‟t until the 1970‟s that the effects of ability grouping came to the forefront (Rowan & 
Miracle 1983, p.134). Research done in the 1970‟s showed “that initial inequalities in 
achievement were actually increased over time by ability group systems,” thus increasing the 
gap between the “high performers” and the “low performers” (ibid). This gap has been ex-
plained by the teachers acting different to the students of the high performance group vis-à-vis 
the low performs or that there is a difference in pacing between the groups (Rowan & Miracle 
1983, p.134-135). A study by Rowan & Miracle shows that “friends influence student behav-
ior in schools” and high performers have a positive effect on low performers which 
 “demonstrates the importance of instructional grouping to student achievement” (Rowan & 
Miracle 1983, p.142). 
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4.1.2 School Choice 
The question of school choice, the right of the parent/student to choose which school to at-
tend, is something that has been debated heavily both in Scandinavia and in the United States 
(Söderström & Uutisalo 2004, p.3). The proponents argue that “the competitive forces un-
leashed by school choice increase efficiency” while the opponents claim that “choice merely 
increases segregation” (ibid). Söderström & Uutisalo did a study about the introduction of 
school choice in Stockholm, Sweden 2000 and the effects on segregation (Söderström & 
Uutisalo 2004). They found that “segregation increased along all other observable dimen-
sions, particularly along the ethnic and socio-economic lines” showing that the free school 
choice had led to an increase in stratification within the education system of Stockholm 
(Söderström & Uutisalo 2004, p.24). 
 
4.1.3 Early Sorting 
Early sorting is similar to ability grouping in that they are both concerned with division of 
students into different groups. Proponents of early sorting often argues that it‟s better for stu-
dents to be with students of the same ability while opponents claim that the object of early 
sorting is to keep class and status differences intact. In contrast to ability grouping, this takes 
place in the class room, early sorting deals with the division of students into separate schools 
and programs of study. 
 Early sorting has been known for a long time to have a positive effect on strati-
fication and for every transition there is in an education system students from lower class 
and/or status backgrounds are more likely to be “left behind” (Neugebaur & Schindler 2012, 
p.20-21). In conservative welfare regimes, such as Germany, were status and class differences 
are relatively more important there are also more transitions to make and students have to 
make them earlier (Neugebaur & Schindler 2012, p.22). Neugebaur and Schindler studied the 
effects of these transitions in the German education system and could show that for every 
transition the percentage of working class students dropping out is significantly higher com-
pared to that of students from other background even when the GPA is similar (2012, p.26-
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27). Other studies in countries of different welfare regimes, such as the liberal regime and 
Canada, also show the effects that sorting have on stratification (Friesen & Krauth 2007). 
 
4.1.4 Standardized testing 
Standardized testing is a policy that has become more widespread within the field of educa-
tion over the last decades. The idea behind it is that academic standards can be raised by hold-
ing educators and students accountable by the means of an “objective” standardized test in 
order to check that they attain the goals set out by the government (Kearns 2011, p.113). Op-
ponents of standardized testing on the other hand claim that standardized testing only encour-
ages “teaching to the test” and that it disadvantages students from lower social backgrounds. 
 If standardized testing does disadvantage students with a lower class or status 
background it would have an impact on stratification. According to studies done on Canadian 
schools standardized testing does indeed “reproduce existing inequalities” and that “children 
from families of lower socio-economic status (SES) don‟t do as well in school as those 
from wealthier families” (Kearns 2011, p.114). (Roos et al., 2006, p. 1). Not only that but 
standardized testing shapes the image that these students have of themselves and discourages 
them from education (Kearns 2011, p.126). 
 
4.1.5 Pre-School 
Policies and variables that effect stratification in the education system is not only 
limited to the education system itself, one of these variables is the availability and 
affordability of pre-school education for children. This makes sense since pre-
school shapes the whole day of the child and what he/she does or doesn‟t pick up 
there is bound to have an effect on them. According to a study by Chausa and 
Chapuis pre-school is a very strong factor when it comes to education stratifica-
tion and that “countries that emphasize child care and pre-school institutions ex-
hibit lower levels of inequality of opportunity” this suggests that early interven-
tions, such as pre-schools, are critical to reduce differences in education outcomes 
(2010, p.2). In fact high levels of pre-school enrollment in a country seem to de-
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crease the effect of the school environment on student results (Chausa & Chapuis 
2010, p.32).  
4.2 Analysis of the Data 
The four countries examined in this study all differ from each other in several ways even 
though they are all part of the same welfare regime. Their welfare state and education system 
have different histories, they are of different sizes (most notably Sweden), and their econo-
mies differ. Because of this it is not possible to simply group all the results together but one 
must examine each country against its own past in order to determine if there has been a 
change in stratification within the education system. In this chapter I‟ll be going through each 
country and how they have changed, in accordance with the variables presented in the previ-
ous chapter, since 1990. The red color in the figures below represent policies that creates a 
lower degree of stratification while green represent policies that create more stratification, 
yellow is intermediate. These values are all relative compared to the countries in the study 
 
 
Fig.1 The importance of School Choice 
 
School Choice 1990 2013 
Denmark Not Possible (1) Possible (4) 
Finland Not Possible (2) Possible in Some Cases (5) 
Norway Not Possible (3) Possible (6) 
Sweden Not Possible Possible (7) 
(1. Lov om folkeskolen 1975) (2. Grundskolelagen 1989) (3. Grunnskoleloven 
1990 §13). (4. Retsinformation.dk) (5. Grundskolelagen 2012) (6. Educa-
tion Act Norway 2010) (7. EURES 2013:4) 
 
The right to decide which school your child is easily the variable that has 
changed the most over the past 23 years. In 1990 new students in elementary school were as a 
rule relegated to the public school within their district in all of the studied countries (although 
that could be changed in special circumstances in Finland). However, in 2013 most of the 
country‟s now let the parents decide where their children should go to school. The exception 
is Finland where the schools can deny a student admittance and Norway where one has the 
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right to go to the school of one‟s choosing as long as there is available space. This represents 
a big shift in how student make ups are determined as well as increased stratification. 
 
 
 
Fig 2. Ability Grouping 
 
 
 
 
(1. Lov om Folkeskolen) (2. Förskola och primärskola i Europeiska Unionen 1994, p.43) (3. 
EURES 2013:1) (4. EURES 2013:2) (5. EURES 2013:3) (6. EURES 2013:4) 
 
The next variable is that of ability grouping and whether it is allowed or prac-
ticed within the education system. As seen in figure 2, students were grouped exclusively ac-
cording to age in 1990. This is still true for Finland and Sweden in 2013 but it has changed 
slightly in Denmark and Norway. In Denmark they practice individual teaching within age 
grouped classes but do not create classes based on ability. In Norway it is up to the individual 
school/headmaster if ability grouping takes place or not. This represent a slight change in fa-
vor of higher stratification in Norway but in most of countries studied nothing or little has 
changed since 1990. 
 
Fig 3. Early Sorting  
 
Early Sorting 1990 2013 
Denmark Upper Secondary School (1) Upper Secondary School (3) 
Finland Upper Secondary School (2) Upper Secondary School (4) 
Norway No Data Upper Secondary Schoo (5) 
Sweden Upper Secondary School Upper Secondary School (6) 
(1. Lov om Folkeskolen 1975) (2. Grundskolelagen1989) (3. 
Retsinformation.dk)  (4. EURES 2013:5) (5. EURES 
2013:6) (6. EURES 2013:7) 
 
Traditionally, students in Scandinavia and the social-democratic welfare regime 
are sorted late especially compared to those in the conservative regime such as Germany or 
Ability Grouping 1990 2013 
Denmark Grouping By Age (1) Individual teaching (3) 
Finland Grouping By Age (2) Grouping by age (4) 
Norway Grouping By Age (2) Flexible grouping (5) 
Sweden Grouping By Age Grouping by age 
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Austria. In 1990 all of the countries in the study started sorting students when they entered 
upper secondary school (Except for Norway where there is a lack of data). This still holds true 
in 2013 and all of the countries, including Norway, sort their students at the end of compulso-
ry education/start of upper secondary school. What differs is whether students who chose vo-
cational programs at the end of lower secondary schools are eligible for higher education. In 
Denmark they are not, while in Finland and Norway students can do extra work in order to 
receive eligibility and in Sweden you are eligible if you have completed a vocational high 
school program. 
 
Fig.4 Standardized Testing 
 
 
Standardized 
testing 
1990 2013 
Denmark End of Lower Secondary School (1) End of Lower Secondary School 
Finland End of Upper Secondary School (2) End of Upper Secondary School 
Norway End of Primary (3) End of Lower Secondary School 
Sweden No Standardized Testing No Standardized Testing 
 
(1. Lov om Folkeskolen) (2. Grundskolelagen 1989) (3. Förskola och primärskola I Europeiska 
Unionen 1994, p.41) 
The age of when students have to pass standardized testing has generally re-
mained the same across the regime since 1990. In Denmark and Norway, standardized testing 
now takes place at the end of compulsory education (end of lower secondary), while it in Fin-
land takes place at the end of upper secondary school. In Sweden there is no such thing as 
standardized testing though there are non-binding national tests. Norway is the only country 
where the practice of standardized testing has changed during the period of study by moving 
the tests from the end of primary to the end of lower secondary school. Because of the change 
in Norway stratification has actually decreased within the variable of standardized testing. 
 
Fig.5 Availability of Pre-School 
 
 
 
 
  
Pre-School 1990 2013 
Denmark  
Subsidized No Place Guarantee 
(1) 
Subsidized and Guaranteed 
Place 
Finland 
Subsidized and Guaranteed Place 
(2) 
Subsidized and Guaranteed 
Place 
Norway 
Subsidized No Place Guarantee 
(2) 
Subsidized and Guaranteed 
Place 
Sweden Subsidized and Guaranteed Place 
Subsidized and Guaranteed 
Place 
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(1. Bistandsloven 1990, §73) (2. Förskola och Primärskola i Europeiska Unionen, p.1994, p.19-21) (3.  
 
As shown in figure five, pre-school is one of the instances where stratification 
has decreased the most since 1990. In 1990 the social-democratic welfare regime was basical-
ly divided in two when it came to the situation of pre-school education. In Denmark and 
Norway pre-school was subsidized but there weren‟t enough places for everyone and one did 
not have the right to a pre-school place for one‟s child. In Finland and Sweden pre-school was 
both subsidized and one was guaranteed a place in pre-school for your child. Since 1990 you 
are now also have the right to a pre-school place in both Denmark and Norway. This repre-
sents a shift towards lower stratification within the regime. 
Finally, since 1990 there has been a significant drop in the rate of trade union 
density according to the OECD (OECD 2012) From 75,3% to 68,5% in Denmark, from 
72,5% to 69% in Finland, from 58,5% to 54,7% in Norway and from 80% to 67,5% in Swe-
den (OECD 2012) Thus, union density in all of the countries has dropped in the time period 
relevant to the study. According to the Power Resource Theory there should therefore have 
been an increase in stratification within the education systems as well as the rest of the wel-
fare state. 
 
 
 
  27 
5 Conclusion 
 
 
The result of the study and the different variables show a mixed picture in whether the loss of 
power for the working class and its allies have led to an increase in stratification within the 
education sector. While the ability of parents to choose which school their children attends 
from an early age has increased across the board (with Finland as a notable exception), there 
has also been an expansion in the availability of pre-school for the different populations. Oth-
er variables are likewise mixed. In Norway, standardized testing is not as prevalent today 
compared to 1990 while it hasn‟t changed at all in the other countries. Ability grouping is 
now more accepted in Denmark and Norway but in Sweden and Finland there has been not 
shift at all. Finally, there has been no shift at all in when students are first sorted in any of the 
countries studied. This shows that while stratification has increased in some areas the educa-
tion systems of the regimes are not on a straightforward path to a more divided and stratified 
future. 
 One of the areas where there is a clear decrease in stratification is the pre-school 
variable. In all of the studied countries pre-school is now seen as a right and is heavily subsi-
dized. One reason for that, even though it‟s not within the scope of the study, is that unlike the 
other variables expanding the access to pre-school also expands the pool of available labor. 
Expanding access to pre-school could therefore be beneficial to employers and might explain 
why it has expanded while the power of the working class has weakened. 
 The school choice variable is, as previously mentioned, the variable which has 
seen the greatest expansion in stratification. In general it is not parents from lower socio-
economic backgrounds that choose better schools, as the proponents claim, but parents from 
higher socio-economic backgrounds that reject schools. This creates an increased division 
within the education systems when schools become more and more divided based upon social 
class. Notably this also divides and stratifies students before they have even started school, 
with the students from working/lower class background and upper class students being sorted 
into good/poor schools from the beginning. 
 For future studies a more detailed look into the expansion and effects of school 
choice within not only the social-democratic but also the conservative and liberal regime 
would be warranted. The variables utilized in this study would also be valuable for similar 
studies within the Conservative or Liberal regime as well as for non-temporal studies between 
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the regimes. There is also the question of which variables accurately represent stratification 
and more work in this area is definitely needed. 
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7 Appendix 
7.1 Table with variable results 
Denmark 
  
  1990 2013 
School choice No Yes 
      
Ability grouping By Age Individual teaching but not groups 
      
Grades From 8th Grade From 8th Grade 
      
Standardized testing 
Exams at the end of compulsory 
education Exams at the end of compulsory education 
      
Early sorting Sorting in upper secondary Sorting in upper secondary 
    Vocational may not be eligible for higher education 
      
Pre-school The parents pay 35% of the cost Subsdized 
    Right to a place for kid in day care 
   
Finland 
  
  1990 2013 
School choice Only in special circumstances Yes but it is at the discretion of the school applied to 
      
Ability grouping Grouped according to age Grouped according to age 
      
Grades From grade one Varies possible from first grade 
      
Standardized testing Final examination upper secondary None in the compulsory final examination in upper secondary 
      
Early sorting Unitary primary school (grade 7-10) Sorting between vocational, general in upper secondary 
    
Vocational students may do extra work in order to get into higer 
education 
      
Pre-school Fees Subsidized 
  Right to place in day care Voluntary/right to a place in day care 
   
Norway 
  
  34 
  1990 2013 
School choice No If there are avalible places 
      
Ability grouping Grouped according to age Flexible 
      
Grades From year 7 From 8th grade 
      
Standardized testing Test at end of primary/lower seconary Compulsory at end of grade 10 
      
Early sorting   Sorting between vocational, general in upper secondary 
    
Vocational students can take a suplementary program for Uni admis-
sion 
      
Pre-school Subsidized Subsidized 
  Not guaranteed a place Voluntary/right to a place in day care 
   Sweden 
    1990 2013 
School choice No Yes 
      
Ability grouping No No 
      
Grades From year 8 From year 6 
      
Standardized testing No standardized testing No standardized testing 
      
Early sorting Sorting at the end of compulsory Sorting at the end of compulsory 
      
      
Pre-school Subsidized Subsidized 
  Guaranteed a place Guarnteed a place 
 
